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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of the representatives need appear, permitting the unincorporated asso-
ciation to select a representative group diverse from their adversary.85
One more nick has been carved from the impractical common law
rule by Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act80 which provides for
damage suits by or against unincorporated associations in federal courts
for breach of collective bargaining contracts without regard to juris-
dictional amount or the citizenship of the parties.
Because of the uncertainties and limitations of the North Carolina
statutes which abrogate, in part, the common law rule as to suability of
unincorporated associations, and because of the need for a simple method
of suit by and against the many powerful and well established fraternal,
religious, and trade union bodies that exist today, a specific statute allow-
ing such suits in North Carolina courts and thereby in the federal courts
sitting in North Carolina is again suggested. 7
HURSHELL H. KEENER.
Wills-Two Methods of Probate in Solemn Form
in North Carolina'
According to a recent statutory survey,' there are nineteen states
which permit the probate of a will without requiring that notice be
given to all interested parties as a condition precedent. North Carolina
is listed as one of these states,2 since in this jurisdiction both types of
probate, common and solemn form, have been preserved.8 The author
comments: .. . it is clear that a rational basis exists for those [states]
which follow the pattern of the English probate without notice, first,
because, estates commonly need the supervision of the executor imme-
diately on the death of the testator; and, second, because in the vast
majority of cases there is not the remotest possibility of a contest and
the probate of the will can be reduced to an administrative formality.
But since the heir then has no opportunity to contest before probate,
he must be given that opportunity afterward.' ' 4 The increasing num-
1 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F. 2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948) ; Tunstall
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 148 F. 2d 403 (4th Cir.
1945) ; Philadelphia Local 192 v. American Federation of Teachers, 44 F. Supp.
345 (E. D. Pa. 1942) ; International Allied Printing Trades Ass'n v. Master Print-
ers Union, 34 F. Supp. 178 (D. N. J. 1940).
161 STAT. 136 (1947); 29 U. S. C. A. §141-147 (Supp. 1947); Note, 2
SOUTHWESTERN L. J. 246 (1948).
"The text of such a statute was proposed in Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 335,
338 (1950).
Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 MicH. L. REv. 503 (1946).
2 See N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-14 (1950); A Survey of Statutory Changes in
North Carolina in 1933, 11 N. C. L. REv. 263 (1933).
'In re Will of Chisman, 175 N. C. 420, 95 S. E. 769 (1918). This conclusion
also follows by necessary implication from N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-32 (1950), which
governs the filing of a caveat during or after probate "in common form."
' Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 Mic,. L. REv. 503, 539 (1946).
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ber of cases which hinge on the procedural relationship between the
clerk of superior court, who has exclusive jurisdiction over probates in
common form,5 and the superior court, which has derivative jurisdiction
over probates in solemn form,6 belies the appearance of simplicity im-
parted to the North Carolina system by the use of these two historically
well-defined forms of probate.
All probate proceedings in this state commence with an application
for probate to the clerk of superior court.7 Since the proceeding is
in rem, no one interested is before the clerk except the propounders
and witnesses,8 and if there is no objection to the will, it is admitted
to probate. Such probate, called probate in common form, is conclusive
of the validity of the will unless it is set aside in a later proceeding by
direct attack.9 A collateral attack is only permitted if the clerk was
deceived by fraud or perjury,10 or if the will is so vague as to be a
nullity."' The clerk may set aside the probate on these grounds, but
not on grounds which should be raised by caveat." Such probate
must be vacated, however, either by motion to the clerk or by caveat,
and the probate of a later will is not sufficient to meet this require-
ment.3 All direct attacks are barred after three years from the date
of probate unless the caveator is under twenty-one years of age, insane,
or imprisoned, in which case the bar attaches three years from the
removal of the disability.14  Should the caveator be found to have par-
ticipated in a transaction which is dependent upon the validity of the
will which was probated, he may be barred by estoppel to question the
will.' 5
Anderson v. Atldnson, 234 N. C. 271, 66 S. E. 2d 886 (1951) ; Brissie v. Craig,
232 N. C. 701, 62 S. E. 2d 330 (1950).
6 Brissie v. Craig, 232 N. C. 701, 62 S. E. 2d 330 (1950) ; In re Will of Hine,
228 N. C. 405, 45 S. E. 2d 526 (1947).
7 N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-16 (1950). The court has said that "it is the policy
of the law that wills should be probated," so it would seem that the application
cannot be withdrawn once it is submitted to the clerk. Wells v. Odum, 207
N. C. 226, 228, 176 S. E. 563, 564 (1934).
8 See, e.g., In re Will of Rowland, 202 N. C. 373, 375, 162 S. E. 897, 898
(1932) ; In re Will of Chisman, 175 N. C. 420, 421, 95 S. E. 769, 770 (1918).
SN. C. GEN. STAT. §31-19 (1950) ; and, e.g., It re Will of Puett, 229 N. C. 8
47, S. E. 2d 488 (1948); In re Will of Rowland, 202 N. C. 373, 162 S. E. 897
(1932). The record of probate in common form is not admissible as evidence in
the caveat proceediugs. In re Will of Etheridge, 231 N. C. 502, 57 S. E. 2d 768
(1950).
10 In re Will of Puett, 229 N. C. 8, 47 S. E. 2d 488 (1948) ; In re Will of
Johnson, 182 N. C. 522, 109 S. E. 373 (1921).
' Burchett v. Mason, 233 N. C. 306, 63 S. E. 2d 634 (1951).
"2it re Will of Hine, 228 N. C. 405, 45 S. E. 2d 526 (1947). In re Will of
Brock, 229 N. C. 482, 487, 50 S. E. 2d 555, 559 (1948), for example, lists undue
influence and lack of testamentary capacity as among the grounds for caveat.
13 In re Will of Puett, 229 N. C. 8, 47 S. E. 2d 488 (1948).
"4 N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-32 (Supp. 1951).
" Burchett v. Mason, 233 N. C. 306, 63 S. E. 2d 634 (1951) (.holding that
persons who participated in proceedings to sell timber from lands devised by the
will in question are thereafter estopped from attacking the validity of the will).
1952]
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The usual type of probate in solemn form is by formal caveat,1"
which immediately raises an issue of fact (devisavit vel non). The
clerk must then transfer the case to the superior court for trial.17 Cita-
tions must be issued to all interested persons,' 8 who may come in and
align themselves with either the propounder or the caveator if they
wish, but if they have notice, they are bound by the proceedings whether
they participate or not.' 9 At this stage of the proceedings the matter
is out of the hands of the interested persons, and there can be no agreed
statement of facts, waiver of jury trial, or nonsuit.2 0 Those interested
persons not cited are not estopped to file a second caveat, even though
the will was upheld following the first.21 The converse does not fol-
low, however, for the court has indicated that the executor who pro-
pounds the will acts in a representative capacity for all persons who
favor the will, and it might extend this concept to any propounder.
22
Should a person who desires to attack a purported will be unable to
get it propounded by another, he may both propound and caveat the
will, and thus secure an early determination of its invalidity.
23
The other type of probate in solemn form, which may be concluded
without a formal caveat, has remained in the background until recently.
This is the proceeding by which the propounder petitions the clerk to
issue citations to all interested persons to come and "see proceedings."
In 1834, Chief Justice Ruffin, well known for his comprehensive opin-
ions, set out the procedure for such a probate as follows: "To enable
See N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-32 (Supp. 1951).
'7 N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-33 (1950).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-33 (1950); In re Will of Rowland, 202 N. C. 373,
162 S. E. 897 (1932).9 See Mills v. Mills, 195 N. C. 595, 143 S. E. 130 (1928); Redmond v. Col-
lins, 15 N. C. 430 (1834).
" See, e.g., In re Will of Morrow, 234 N. C. 365, 67 S. E. 2d 279 (1951)
Collins v. Collins, 125 N. C. 98, 34 S. E. 195 (1899). But see Bailey v. McLain,
215 N. C. 150, 1 S. E. 2d 372 (1939) (caveator allowed to withdraw pursuant to
agreement with propounder), criticized in Note, 18 N. C. L. REv. 76 (1939).
21 Mills v. Mills, 195 N. C. 595, 143 S. E. 130 (1928).
22 Redmond v. Collins, 15 N. C. 430, 442 (1834).
2 Such a problem faced the plaintiff in Brissie v. Craig, 232 N. C. 701, 62 S. E.
2d 330 (1950). He was in doubt as to whether he had a sufficient interest to pro-
pound the will and feared that, if he did, he might then be estopped to file a
caveat, so he sued in superior court for a judgment declaring the instrument in
question to be invalid as a will. He desired to remove the instrument as a threat
to his title to property inherited from the purported testator. The superior court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff, but the supreme court reversed, holding that
the superior court had no iurisdiction to hear a case within the exclusive iuris-
diction of the clerk. Justice Ervin, speaking for the court, by way of dictum,
proposed to the plaintiff that he should have simultaneously propounded and filed
a caveat to the will. Two conclusions are implicit in the decision: first, that N. C.
GEN. STAT. §31-15 (1950), which gives the clerk the power to compel the produc-
tion of a will for probate, does not give him the power to compel probate of the
will when produced; and second, that a propounder is not estopped to caveat the




the propounder to bind others a decree is taken out by him to summon
all persons, 'to see proceedings,' not to become parties, but to witness
what is going on, and take sides if they think proper. If the propounder
does not choose to adopt that course, he may at once take his decree;
which in relation to this subject is called proving the will in common
form. If he take out a decree and summon those in interest against
him, 'to see proceedings,' they are concluded, whether they appear and put
in an allegation against the will or not, and as against those summoned
this is called probate in solemn form." 24 This judicial type of probate
was recognized by Justice Pearson, in 1855,25 but, except for an occa-
sional quotation,26 the procedure so clearly set out lay dormant until
approval was again granted in 1952. In the latter year, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court decided the case of In re Will of Ellis.2 7 Citations
had been issued to the interested persons, and the clerk had held a
hearing. One of the witnesses to the will had testified that he did not
sign in the presence of the testator. This testimony was contradicted
by that of three other persons, but the clerk had refused to admit the
will to probate. The propounder had appealed to the superior court,
which had granted a motion by the heirs to remand the proceedings to
the clerk, holding that the hearing before the clerk constituted a final
trial on the merits which concluded the propounder on the issue of
devisavit vel non. The propounder then appealed to the supreme court,
which reversed the superior court order. Justice Denny, speaking for
a unanimous court, held that the ruling of the clerk is only conclusive
on the subject when no issue of fact is raised by the parties,2s and
that if there is an objection to the will, whether by formal caveat or not,
2, Redmond v. Collins, 15 N. C. 430, 437-38 (1834).
"Etheridge v. Corprew, 48 N. C. 14, 17 (1855).
" Mills v. Mills, 195 N. C. 595, 597, 143 S. E. 130, 132 (1928). Without cita-
tion of authority, the following language is found in DOUGLAS, ADmINISTRATION OF
EsTATs IN NORTH CAROLINA, §43 (1948): ". . . the propounder may himself
elect to have the original probate in solemn form and thus force all dissatisfied
persons to file a caveat then or never. The law is not entirely clear as to how
this should be done, but-it would seem that the propounder may file a petition
asking for probate in solemn form and obtain an order from the clerk for citations
to be issued to all interested parties, returnable on a day named in the citation,
notifying them of the application for probate and directing them to appear if they
wish to do so and 'see proceedings,' in the same general form as citations in cases
of caveats. When such a procedure is followed, dissatisfied persons must file a
caveat in these proceedings, or be forever barred from doing so!'
S235 N. C. 27, 69 S. E. 2d 25 (1952).
28 The opinion quotes the following statement as a correct analysis of the law
on the two forms of probate in solemn form: "(1) Where the next of kin and
other interested persons are cited to appear and 'see proceedings'-and a judg-
ment is entered for or against the will, but there is no verdict of a jury because
no issue is raised by the parties; (2) where a person, entitled to do so, inter-
venes and enters a caveat-denies the validity of the will-and thereby raises an
issue of devisavit vel non, upon which issue a verdict is taken, and judgment
entered in accordance with the verdict." 2 MoRDEcAT, LAW LF=crmzs 1211 (2d
ed. 1916).
1952]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
then the issue of devisavit vet non is raised and must go to the superior
court to be tried by a jury.29 Nothing in the opinion conflicts with
the original statement of Chief Justice Ruffin,30 and this intermediate
procedure, standing between probate in common form and formal caveat,
as defined in 1834 and clarified one hundred and eighteen years later,
will bridge the gap confronting persons who seek to get the validity of
a will settled without having to wait for the three year limitations period
on caveats to expire.31 They may now force an early caveat or none
at all, which is the converse of the situation dealt with in Brissic v.
Craig,32 where a prospective caveator was seeking to have the invalidity
of a will settled. In completing the picture of will probates by the
decisions in Brissie v. Craig and the Ellis case, the court has followed
the path of logic with consistency and accuracy, and the way is now
clear for rapid settlement of estates.
HARPER JOHNsTON ELAM, III.
Workmen's Compensation-Right of Employee to Bring Common
Law Action Against Negligent Co-employee
Plaintiff was injured while riding in an automobile driven by the
president of the corporation by which plaintiff was employed. The
plaintiff was awarded compensation under the North Carolina Work-
" In re Will of Ellis, 235 N. C. 27, 32, 69 S. E. 2d 25, 28 (1952). The court
cited as authority N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-273 (1943), which requires the clerk to
transfer cases to superior court when issues of law and fact, or of fact, are raised
before him in civil cases. In view of the constant reiteration by the court of the
proposition that will probates are proceedings in rem, perhaps a stronger basis for
the requirement of a jury trial on the issue of devisavit ,el non is found in the
following language from In re Will of Roediger, 209 N. C. 470, 476, 184 S. E. 74,
77 (1936) : "A trial by jury cannot be waived by the propounder and the caveator.
Nor can they submit to the court an agreed statement of facts, or consent that
the judge may hear the evidence and find the facts determinative of the issue.
The propounder and the caveator are not parties to the proceeding in the sense
that they can by consent relieve the judge of his duty to submit the issue in-
volved in the proceeding to a jury.
"In the instant case, it was error for the judge to render judgment on the facts
agreed upon by the propounder and the caveator, and supplemented by the facts
found by him, with their consent. The proceeding was in ren, and could not be
controlled by the propounder and the caveator, even with the consent and approval
of the judge. In that respect it is distinguishable from a civil action." (Italics
added.) See also In re Will of Morrow, 234 N. C. 365, 67 S. E. 2d 279 (1951).
" Respondents relied on the statement by Chief Justice Ruffin that "if he [the
propounder] take out a decree and summon those in interest against him, 'to see
proceedings,' they are concluded, whether they appear and put in an allegation
against the will or not. .. " The court did not concern itself with this point,
but a reasonable interpretation of this language, and one which would reconcile
it with the holding of the Ellis case, is that it means only that those interested
persons cited are bound by the final disposition of the case, rather than that the
parties are precluded from appealing to the superior court from the decision of
the clerk.
" See REPORT OF THE CoMMIssION ON REVIsIoN OF THE LAWS OF NORTH CARO-
LINA RELATING TO EsTATEs §2 (1939) (where it is suggested this procedure be
provided by statute).
2 See note 22 supra.
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